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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: Analysis of fisheries management practices in the European
Union and the Gulf of Guinea countries: effectiveness and
perception of resource users.

Degree:

MSc.

This dissertation is a study of fisheries management practices in the Gulf of Guinea
and the European Union countries. It focuses on the access and the conservation
measures and looks at their effectiveness concerning the conservation of the
resource. The perception of resource users towards fisheries management practices
is analyzed and so is the impact of this perception on the enforcement.

The concept of fisheries management is briefly introduced and considerations are
given to the new trends.
Fisheries management practices in the European Union are analyzed through the
Common Fisheries Policy and its tools, the total allowable catch and the quota
system. The effectiveness of the system towards the conservation of the resource is
assessed. The measures the Gulf of Guinea countries take to manage their fisheries
resources including the fisheries agreements are looked at and assessed vis a vis
the resource conservation.
Resource users perception towards management approaches undertaken in both
zones is analyzed and their impact on the compliance displayed. The resources
users have similar perception, which influence their willingness to comply with
decisions.
Propositions are made in both zones to consider the view of resource users and
reinforce the enforcement bodies for a better conservation of fisheries resources.
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KEYWORDS:
Fisheries resources, fisheries management measures, fishermen perception, total
allowable catch, rules and regulations, enforcement, resource conservation
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Justification
The fishery sector and fisheries resources play an important role for humans all over
the planet. They provide a primary source of proteins for millions of people
worldwide as seafood and constitute one of the major food items in many countries.
The average apparent per capita food fish consumption was estimated at 16.2kg
worldwide in 2002 (FAO, 2004).

This fish consumption is, however, unequally distributed around the world; there are
significant differences among countries, depending on the availability of the fish, the
availability of other food, traditions and eating habits. It is rather high in poor coastal
countries as compared with other sources of animal proteins. For instance, the per
capita per year consumption can rise to 50kg or more in South East Asia countries
and in low laying coral islands, where soils are poor to support intensive agriculture
(King, M., 1995, p.8). The Food and Agriculture Organization has reported that the
annual consumption of 21.3 kg of seafood per year represents 61.3 of animal
protein intake in the Comoros Islands (FAO, 1998).

The sector has, as well, a substantial social and economic importance. It employs
and provide livelihood to several millions of people either directly as fishermen or
indirectly in related activities. The Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated
that the number of people earning an income from direct employment from the
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fishing and aquaculture sector was about 38 million, while 200 million people were
depending indirectly on fisheries for their livelihoods in 2002 (FAO, 2004).

“These rough figures are for people earning all or part of their living from the fishing
industry and should be multiplied by at least three to give the number of dependant
family members” (Garcia et al., 1999, p.372).

The sector is equally an important source of income for many countries. In some
countries of the Gulf of Guinea such as Senegal for instance, fisheries products
constitute the most important source of foreign currency, being one of the main
export products of the country and employing 15% of the active population (Dahou,
K. & al., 2002).

However, the important role of the sector is under threat today. The fisheries
production systems are recognized as declining, especially for single species
fisheries (FAO, 1995).

Countries have therefore adopted various fisheries management approaches to
ensure the sustainability of their resources. The European Union countries have on
the one hand opted for a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). This is an “output
limitation scheme” where the total allowable catches (TACs) for particular fishing
species are decided by the Council and each member country is allocated quotas,
which is a share of the TACs through the principle of relative stability. Each member
state will thereafter distribute the quota decided by the Council to their fishermen
according to criterion that differs from one country to another (Malvino, C. & al.,
2002). In this system, the role of the research is important by determining the total
allowable catch, based on the Council’s final decision.

In the Gulf of Guinea countries on the other hand, there is no common global
fisheries policy. Countries apply individual fisheries management measures,
extensively based on the “input limitation scheme”, where fishing effort is controlled
through licenses (Garcia, 2002). However, in some countries, which have exclusive
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economic zones rich in resource, the fishing rights are granted to foreign fishing
companies through fisheries agreements (Kaczynski, 2001).

Despite all these efforts on resource management, the trends of landings show that
there is a progressive decline of the production (FAO, 2004). The relative scarcity of
fisheries resources is becoming more generalized and this trend will rather continue
in the future due to the increasing demand, associated to the world population
growth and the technological development of fishing methods. GESAMP has
therefore argued that the amount of fish caught for direct humans consumption may
fall by a fifth from 50 million tonnes in 2002 to 40 million tonnes in 2010 (GESAMP,
2002).

This indicates that the management measures undertaken by many countries,
including the European Union and the Gulf of Guinea countries, do not in reality give
the expected results for the conservation of the resource. This is also the case with
the equity objectives of fisheries management, which are rarely successfully met
(Boude, J.P., 2001).

It becomes therefore important to look at the management approaches that are
implemented in both regions and to access their effectiveness in achieving the
conservation of the fishing resource. Furthermore, the perception of the
stakeholders on the issue of resource management and conservation will be
analyzed.

The present study will consider and attempt to answer the following questions:

-What are the fisheries management measures applied in the European Union and
the Gulf of Guinea?
- How effective are these measures in achieving the objectives of resource
conservation?
- How do fishermen perceive these measures and how does this perception impact
on the enforcement?
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- What recommendations can be provided for a better management of fisheries
resources in both regions?

1.2 Organization of the research
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter justifies the research,
identifies its objective and methodology and displays the limitation of the study. The
second chapter describes the fisheries management practices in the European
Union with a particular emphasis on the principal tools of the Common Fisheries
Policy including the total allowable catch and the quota system. The effectiveness of
these tools in achieving the conservation objective is also analyzed.

The third

chapter describes the fisheries management practices in the Gulf of Guinea,
highlighting particularly management in internal waters, the fisheries agreements
and their impact on the conservation of the resource in the zone. The fourth chapter
attempts to analyze the point of view of the resource users as concerns the
management measures and how it impact the conservation of the fisheries
resources in both areas. The summary of the study and the propositions of
amelioration of the management approaches conclude the study.

1.3 Methodology
This dissertation is based primarily on relevant literature from books, periodicals,
journals and publication from the Food and Agriculture Organization and ICES. The
author has also sought and used good information from Internet sources. Further
information was gathered during discussions with World Maritime University (WMU)
professors, visiting professors and some experts during field trips.

A four-week field trip was undertaken in Cameron in July 2006, during which face to
face discussions were organized with fishermen association representatives, in four
fishing coastal fishing villages (Limbe, Batoke, Tiko and Youpwe). Equally, a
discussion was conducted with the master of three fishing vessels as they were

4

landing to offload and sell their caches. The aim of the face to face discussions was
to gather information on the resource users’ perception towards management
measures.
The discussions were supported by a guide, which determine the topics so as to
ensure that all the areas are covered (Appendix I).
The local representatives of the ministry in charge of fisheries were also visited, so
as to exchange information and have a global picture of the activity in the area.

1.4 Scope and Limitations
This study was to benefit from the insight of the reports from the various institutions
in both areas of studies. This was not, however, the case especially for the countries
of the Gulf of Guinea where information was difficult to get.

The information on the resource users’ perception was gathered from four fishing
villages; which may not significantly represent the entire Gulf of Guinea countries.
Similarly, for a proper comparison, the interview planned with fishermen in Histshals,
Denmark could not take place; limitating the analysis to secondary information.
These shortcomings have therefore put a limit to the scope of this study.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CONCEPT OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

2.1 Definition and concept

A clear definition of fisheries management is not widely accepted. The numerous
proposed definitions usually describe the set of activities that are developed under
the concept. The following definition is proposed by the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO).

Fisheries management is the integrated process of information gathering,
analysis, planning, consultation, decision-making, allocation of resources and
formulation and implementation, with enforcement as necessary, of regulations
or rules which govern fisheries activities in order to ensure the continued
productivity of the resources and accomplishment of other fisheries objectives.

FAO (Fisheries management, 1997, p.7)

This definition suggests that to give an optimal benefit to local users, states or
regions for the sustainable utilization of marine resources to which they have access,
fisheries management should include two levels of activities: the strategic level and
the operational level.

The strategic component is concerned with the development, setting of policies and
the formulation of legislation for the fisheries or stock to manage, which take into
account the scientific knowledge available on the resource such as the biological
characteristics of the stock, the existing or potential fisheries and the contribution to
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local or national social and economic needs. This stage is arguably the most critical
element in the fisheries management process. It shows the way that fisheries
management should go and the implementation that follows is done to achieve the
policy. Therefore a wrong policy may lead to wrong management measures, which
can have disastrous socio-economic and fish stocks impact. This was the case with
the Canadian cod fishery sector, which collapsed in the early 1990´s due to the
federal Canadian Government failing to take an appropriate policy following a visible
decline in Newfoundland cod fisheries, resulting in the closure of the fisheries in
1992 and over 40,000 lost jobs (Parson, 1993).

The operational stage on the other hand will determine and implement the
necessary actions, which guide fisheries to keep within the overall strategic goals
and policy directions.

According to Charles, A. (2001, p.85) the required actions should include the
development and the implementation of a management plan of all managed stock;
the determination of the level of fishing effort or the catch corresponding to the
objectives set at the strategic level; the determination of the management measures
that can feasibly achieve the above effort or catch level and which are compatible
with the strategic management policy choices and the implementation of the set of
chosen management measures, including the enforcement of the corresponding
regulations.

The FAO (1997) went further by suggesting the tasks that should be undertaken at
the operational level of fisheries management, which should ensure that the stocks
and the ecosystem within which they occur are maintained in the productive state. In
fact, the concern of the ecosystem health is the basis of the ecosystem based
management approach of fisheries management currently advocated by many
International Organizations and Non Governmental Organizations as a way to
reverse the declining trend of fisheries resources (FAO, 2003; Lundin, 2006). In
addition, the scientific data necessary for the assessment, the monitoring, the
control and surveillance of fisheries activities should as well be collected and
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analyzed at this stage. These activities are the outcome of fisheries research aiming
at providing advice to fisheries managers in the form of a range of possible
management actions (King, M., 1995, p.269).
The operational level should, however, adopt and promulgate appropriate and
effective laws, regulations and management measures necessary to achieve the
objectives and ensure that fishers comply with them, achieving therefore the overall
policy set out at the strategic phase. The laws and regulations as well as the
management actions should therefore be effective, widely accepted, and
enforceable by all the stakeholders. Consequently, it is of overall importance that the
tasks at both the strategic and operational levels should be done with the
participation of all the stakeholders including the policy makers, the fishermen, the
fisheries researchers and the non-governmental organizations.

This approach is clearly advocated by the Food and Agricultural Organization, which
advices a broad consultation with all the interested parties when developing the
tasks aiming at working towards the identified objectives (FAO, 2003, p.7). The
consultation here is supposed to integrate the view of all the interested parties and
therefore enhances the enforcement.

Some studies conducted to identify the impact of fishermen participation in policy
formulation and the setting of management measures on the enforcement of
conservation measures came to a conclusion that the fishermen are more willing to
follow conservation measures when they have participate in the decision making
rather than when the measures are imposed by the policy maker. This participation
gives them incentives to adopt long-term conservation strategies (EU, 2002). Indeed,
as suggested by Mc Cay, fisheries management is not the management of fish but
the management of fishermen (Bryceson, 2006).

However, various degrees of participation in decision-making results in different
management strategies by fishermen. Malvido, C. I. et al. (2002), while looking at
the management systems in the European Union fisheries, considered the change
in the behavior of the resource users in the presence of different properties regimes
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and their participation in the definition of that property. They found that long term
efficient and conservationist behaviors depend on property rights held by the
fishermen and their effective role in the shaping of the rules that regulates it; the
sole owner being the reference for their optimum exploitation.

2.2 Objectives
The objectives of fisheries management are many and vary from a fishery to another.
Three categories of objectives are often viewed as falling into fishery management:
biology (conservation), economy and social (equity) (FAO, 1983, p20; Charles, A.,
2001, p.71).

2.2.1 Conservation objectives

The conservation objectives of fisheries management are concerned with the
sustainability of the resource. They ensure that the fullest sustainable advantage is
derived from the living resource base and that the exploitation is so initiated and
conducted that the resource base is maintained. These objectives imply that the
exploitation of the resource should be done in a way to which safeguards ecological
processes, productivity and genetic diversity for the maintenance of the resource
concerned.

King (1993) maintained that conservation is sometimes viewed as synonymous with
preventing over fishing. He however distinguished two types of over fishing: growth
over fishing and recruitment over fishing and argues that the conservation objectives
should aim at preventing the recruitment over fishing so as to ensure that the
survival of a stock or group of stocks is not threatened.
These biologically based objectives may include the aim of maximizing the yield
either in weight or in revenue by maintaining a particular level of stock in order to
provide a buffer against poor recruitment years or maintaining a minimum spawning
stock.
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Many management tools are used to achieve conservation objectives. They may be
an output control scheme that place limitations on catches or an input control
scheme that puts limitations on gears or fishing vessels. However, one of the most
used conservation objectives is the maximum sustainable yield as it was recognized
that maximizing the long-term sustainable yield is the most important aim of fisheries
management.
Consequently, King (1995) suggested that the main task of fisheries management is
to follow strategies and objectives, which ensure the long term sustainability of
fisheries resources and which prevent both biological over fishing and the disruption
of the marine ecosystems.

This approach advocated by biologists and conservationists aims at ensuring the
preservation and the sustainability of the resource, and hence fishing activities. In
this approach, fisheries research is very important in advising managers with a good
and accurate stock assessment so as to adopt appropriate regulations that ensure
optimum fishing effort and catches resulting in the sustainability of the resources.

However, to these biological and environmental concerns, fisheries management
objectives have extended to address additional economic and social concern such
as fishermen welfare, economic efficiency, and the allocation of the resources. The
broad objectives of fisheries management may therefore include, in addition to the
conservation of fisheries resources and their environment, the maximization of
economic return from the fishery and payment of the fees to the community from
profits made by the exploitation of public resources.

2.2.2 Economic objectives
Fisheries economists who argue that the appropriate management objectives should
focus on economic efficiency of the fishing industry have criticized conservation
approaches of fisheries management. Considerations are therefore given to the
contribution of the fishing industry to the local or national economy. The tools used
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to achieve these objectives may include the maximum net economic yield (MEY),
which is considered to be the most important; the entry licensing coupled with
restrictions, an output control in the form of taxation and individual transferable
quotas.

The maximum economic yield and individual transferable quotas seem the most
used tools to foster economic viability particularly in fishery where, the resource is
relatively stable, the number of enterprises is relatively small and the number of
landing points is small.

2.2.3 Social Objectives

Fisheries are a vital source of employment and income for coastal communities. The
Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated 200 millions people depending on
fisheries for their livelihood worldwide (FAO, 2004).

Despite this importance, Parsons (1993) indicates that social objectives for fishery
policy have rarely been clearly articulated, although social considerations have often
strongly

influenced

fisheries

management

decisions.

Therefore,

fisheries

management objectives have often been called to serve social goals of maximizing
employment and supporting communities’ in areas where there are few alternatives
employment opportunities (PMEDP, 2004). Moreover, the issue of equity, which
includes the equitable distribution of the resource among users, is often considered
in designing fisheries management objectives.
This is the case with the European Union common fishery policy, where the relative
stability principle was established to ensure the equitable access of fisheries
resources by all the countries (EU, 2001).
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2.2.4 Conflict of objectives

The aims pursued by a set of objectives might conflict with others. For instance, the
conservations objectives adopted for a particular fishery might conflict with the
economic objectives that focus on economic return of the activity.

Conflicting objectives may therefore lead to bad management decisions. It is then of
overall importance to have a hierarchy of objectives in a fishery where many set of
objectives is applied. Pearson (1993) has argued that in the absence of a clear
systematic hierarchical set of objectives, there cannot be any rational fishery
management.

Sinclair et al. (2002), when reviewing the choice of management objectives by
fisheries managers over years, concluded that the interest of fisheries managers for
economic and conservation concerns have waxed and waned.

However, the most important criteria underlying the choice of management
objectives are the resource status. There is therefore, a general agreement that
conservation should take precedence over economic or social considerations when
the future of the resource is jeopardized. On the contrary, economic and social
factors will take precedence over conservation objectives when the survival of the
resource is not at stake.

There is, however, no inherent contradiction between “conservation” and “economic”
objectives or between steps to safeguard ecosystem processes, productivity and
biodiversity on the one hand and the economic return of the activity and its
contribution to sustainable development of coastal economies and communities on
the other.

Consequently, certain extreme conservationist or preservationist

objectives can be both anti-people and anti-development and extreme reductionistic
economic policies and objectives for example the one emphasizing economic return
and growth may be harmful to the fish stocks but also harmful to the interests of
coastal communities in the long term (Bryceson, 2006).
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Moreover, any particular regulatory technique can have multiple effects and impact
on more than one objective of fisheries management. Charles, A.( 2001, p.72)
considers that although in theory it is assumed that there is only one single objective
in fisheries, the reality shows that there are multiple strategic, undeclared objectives
pursued simultaneously.

2.3 New Trends

Fisheries management practices have changed over time. Caddy et al. (2001), while
reviewing the development of fisheries management, have recognized that the
practice has evolved from the 1900s, where the debate was centered on whether or
not the apparent boundless fish stock of the ocean could be depleted by fishing, to a
more recognition of the harmful effect of fishing activities on the resource.

The concept of fisheries management today, which incorporates more science
including biology, economics, social and institutional issues, is far more holistic and
self-critical than ever (EU, 2002).

2.3.1 Ecosystem-based management

The fisheries operations and fishing gear used usually have bad effects on the fish,
fish habitats and marine ecosystem. Zeller (2004) argues that traditional
management approaches have failed to maintain sustainable levels of catches as
well as controlling unaccepted impacts on the ecosystems in which fisheries are
embedded (Zeller, 2004).

The ecosystem-based management tries to incorporate ecosystems considerations
into fisheries planning and implementation. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to
clearly understand the ecosystem dynamics, the spatial and functional pattern of
marine ecosystems as well as the role of man in marine ecosystems (Sinclair et al.,
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2002).However, there is not only one type of ecosystem in the marine environment.
Linden (2006), giving the typology of marine ecosystem on a global scale
distinguishes interalia, pelagic ecosystem, demersal ecosystem, benthic ecosystem,
mangrove ecosystem, salt march ecosystem and argues that management
concerns should be addressed accordingly. This view is supported by Sinclair (2002,
p.258), who asserts that to protect the diversity of marine ecosystem types there is a
need to limit ocean activities to spatial scales corresponding to the relevant
ecosystem.

Moreover, the fact that there are many types of marine ecosystems, and that there
is interconnectivity among them, implies that any activity developed in one particular
type of ecosystem might impact on other activities and ecosystems. The ecosystem
considerations in fisheries management therefore imply that fisheries is considered
in the context of other ocean and coastal zone uses such as oil and gas exploration
and extraction, aquaculture, marine transportation, coastal zone habitation, and the
release of contaminants, in a form of integrated and holistic management of ocean
uses (Linden, 2006).

This new approach, focusing on the ecosystem’s health for a sound management of
the resources is currently advocated by many International Organizations and Non
Governmental Organizations (FAO, 2003; Lundin, 2006). Indeed, the global
framework for this ecosystem health approach was laid down in the Food and
Agriculture Organization‘s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995).

2.3.2 Precautionary approach

The precautionary principle elaborated initially in Germany in the 1970s states in the
general form that scientific uncertainty should not be a reason to postpone
measures to prevent environmental harm (Linden, 2006).
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The application of the precautionary principle to fisheries management was
endorsed after the 1992 Rio summit into the UN Fish Stock Agreement and into the
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 2004). The UN Fish stock
Agreement contains the practical application of the precautionary approach. It
requires States to take complex decisions on two types of precautionary reference
points.

One is the limit reference point, which is associated with danger: if a fish stock fall
below this level, pre- agreed conservation and management actions should de
undertaken to support the stock recovery. The overall of management strategies is
therefore to ensure that the risk to exceed reference point is very low. The other the
target reference point in which the management strategies should ensure that these
are not in average exceeded.

However, given the risk, the uncertainty and the political pressure associated with
fisheries; Stokke et al. (2004) considers that the precautionary approach requires
adaptations in the generation of scientific advice but also in the decision making
process.

2.3.3 Community-based fisheries management

The community based fisheries management, also known as co management in a
joint management through a cooperative organization of government and resource
users.

It therefore involves decentralized control in which the government and the
community share management responsibilities. Communities participate in the
decision making process, make and implement regulations, determine fisheries
management measures, supervise their implementation and invoke penalties when
management measures and guidelines are ignored (Trisk, 2005).
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The community-based fisheries management therefore puts more management
responsibility on the shoulder of the stakeholders. It has the advantage to give
incentives for the enforcement of management decisions by the stakeholders as
they participate in their design and implementation.

This approach, although not new, has come as an alternative to the failure of
centralized management and the evidence of stock depletion (Grossling, 2006).
However, not all the fisheries co management practices have been successful.
Conflicts among member of the community for the resource use and for the
leadership are among the problems that lessen the success of the approach
(Chircop, 2006).
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CHARTER THREE
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
The fisheries resources in the European Union countries are managed at the level of
the Union Council through the common fisheries policy.

3.1 The Common Fisheries Policy
3.1.1 The Concept of the Common Fisheries Policy

The concept of the Common Fisheries Policy was established in the treaties, which
created the European community. It states that there should be common fisheries
rules adopted at the Community level and implemented in all member states (Stokke
et al., 2004).

It was, however, agreed that community fishermen should have equal access to
member states waters, ecxept for territorial waters (12 nautical miles), that was
reserved to local fishermen who have traditionally fished in the areas and is
managed by the countries authorities. The European community instead of member
states manages the fishing resources in EEZs.

The Common Fisheries Policy was established in 1970. Since then, it has
undergone several reviews, the last one being the 2002 reform. Boude et al. (2001),
while revisiting the two CFP reforms of 1992 and 2002 maintained that although
some changes in policy were clearly noticed, the focus was still in the area of the
conservation of the resource particularly in the determination of a safe level of
catches without upsetting the balance and the renewal of the stock.
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The first review in 1992 noted that there were too many vessels for the available
resources and that technical measures and control alone could not prevent over
fishing and that the amount of fishing was to be regulated too. Control measures
were therefore developed to ensure that rules are respected throughout the industry.

The second review in 2002 tried to adjust enforcement and marketing measures, in
particular the provisions, which restrict access of fishing vessels to the inshore
waters of other countries (12 miles), which cease to apply at the end of 2002.In
addition to the conservation of the resource, other areas were taken into account
including structures, common organization of market and external fisheries.

The management system in the EU today is subject to the rules of the CFP which
encompass four key areas:

(a) Conservation of the stocks- to provide management measures, mainly by
imposing a maximum catch per key species on a yearly basis, to maintain
stocks at sustainable levels while best satisfying the needs of the fishing
industry economically and socially;

(b) Organization of markets – to provide for a common market inside the EU and
to balance production and demand of fish for both producers and consumers;

(c) Structural measures – to provide for the adaptation of the catching sector
primarily to best utilize the stock available for both the short and the long
term interests of the industry;

(d) International agreement - to provide and maintain fishing opportunities for
the European Community fleets operating outside the EU.

(Mardle, S. et al., 2002, p421)
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3.1.2 Objectives
The Green paper on the future of the common fisheries policy produced by the
European Commission reported that despite the fact that there is no specific chapter
on fisheries; the Treaty assigns to the CFP the same objective as the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in its Article 33:

. to increase productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring
the rational development of production and the optimum utilization of the
factors of production, in particular labor;
. to ensure a fair standard of living for the fishing community, in particular
increasing individual earnings;
. to stabilize markets;
. to assure the availability of supplies;
. to assure that supplies reach the consumers at reasonable prices;
. to ensure the principle of non- discrimination.

The specific objectives of the CFP, however, include environmental and consumer
protection concerns.

The article 2 of the Council Regulation No 3760/92(OJ L 389/1, 31.12.92) stipulates
that the exploitation activities pertaining these general objectives shall include the
protection and the conservation of available and accessible living marine resource
ensuring a rational and responsible exploitation on a sustainable basis taking in
account its implication for the marine ecosystems and economic and social condition
of the sector.

The CFP as it stands today aims at:
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(a) ensuring the conservation of increasingly fragile fish stocks while promoting
the continuation of fishing activities;
(b) modernizing the mean of production while limiting fishing effort;
(c) ensuring the proper implementation of conservation measures while member
states retain responsibility in the field of monitoring and monitoring and
sanctions;
(d) maintaining employment while reducing fleet capacity;
(e) ensuring a decent income for fishermen even though the community own
supply of fish products is declining and the EU market depend more heavily
on import each year and;
(f) acquiring rights in waters of third countries without threatening the
sustainable exploitation of fisheries.
(European Commission, 2002,p6)

These objectives, stated in the green paper of the European Commission during the
preparation of the 2002 reform, are not prioritized, which can result in a clear
dilemma and management problems.

Symes (2005) considers that the principal objectives of the CFP after the 2002
reform could be grouped into three: (i) responsible and sustainable fisheries
contributing to healthy marine ecosystem, (ii) economically viable industry serving
the interests of consumers, and (iii) a fair standard of living for those dependent on
the fishing industry. He further argues that these objectives were not too different to
those that guided the previous CFP, but their detailed interpretation and the way
they were to be achieved have changed.

To achieve the conservation of the resource, three key elements were introduced in
the new Regulation 2371/2002.
Firstly, the introduction of multiannual management plans including recovery plans
for cod and hake, to avoid the uncertainty of annual stock assessments and
therefore to assure greater continuity and stability of the management system.
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Secondly, the possibility to move the basic mechanism for the limitation fishing
pressure from the one based on catch quotas to a more flexible system of effort
allocation in the form of day at sea.

Thirdly, a more representation of fishing sector interests and the possibility of
management at a regional level through the creation of the Regional Advisory
Council (RACs), so as to give to the industry a sense of ownership of the policy
decisions ensuring therefore total adhesion and enforcement in the field (Symes,
2005,p260).

In addition to these written objectives, Boude et al. (2001) argues that the Common
Fisheries policy has an “unwritten” more important objective, which is to preserve
social peace.

3.1.3 Organization

The European Union CFP decision-making process (Figure 1) is characterized by
the participation of various institutions within which different actors play different
roles. The decision making process begins with a proposal from the Commission. A
proposal is the result of studies and advices proposed by different relevant groups.
The main institution to prepare the recommendations is the Scientific Technical and
Economic Committee of Fisheries (STECF) of the Commission. The proposals of
this group are eventually prepared after consultation with ICES Advisory Committee
on Fisheries Management (ACFM) that produce scientific advice to the European
Commission.

The Commission then forms a proposal in light of the scientific advice and the
discussions with various relevant departments and committees, including the
Scientific Technical and Economic Committee of Fisheries and the European
Parliament Fisheries Committee.
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Considering the various actors involved, it is often difficult to find a compromise on a
proposal; hence the Commission uses its monopoly of initiative to try and forge
compromises around the proposals (Reyntjens and Wilson, 2004).

The proposals are then sent to the Council of Ministers, made-up of national
ministers from members’ states, which have the final authority to decide on the
policy. The decisions on total allowable catch and quotas and any related measures
are taken by the ministers at the end of year meeting of the Council. At this stage,
negotiation may be required to reach a political agreement on a given measure.

Thereafter, the Commission monitors the implementation of the policy by individual
Member States.

3.1.4 Resource management: access and conservation measures

Fisheries resource management in the European Union waters is an exclusive
Community competence. However, the management of the resource in member
countries coastal waters, which can be up to 12 nautical miles wide, is done by
member states as far as they are delegated powers by the Community (Reyntjens
and Wilson, 2004).
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Figure 1 Decision making process for the Common Fisheries Policy
Source: Daw T et al., 2005

3.1.4.1 Access

The structure of the access rights to European fisheries is influenced by the
common fisheries policy. Among the first community measures for the access to
fishing grounds, it was agreed that community fishermen should have equal access
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to member states waters, except for the coastal zone, which is of 12 miles wide,
reserved for local fishermen who have traditionally fished in the zone (Boude, 2001).

Despite these possibilities, many countries have opted to keep this zone narrower.
This is the case with the United Kingdom inshore waters, where the Sea Fisheries
Committees manage fisheries within six miles (Mardle et al., 2002).

In addition, measures taken by the states within the coastal zone may not be in
conflict with the overall Common Fisheries Policy. Moreover, some individual
countries through the increase regulation such as increasing landing size might
tighten the EC policy.

The fishing resources out of the territorial sea are reserved to the community
fishermen and are managed by the community instead of members’ states. Fishing
activities here are open to all fishermen but are restricted in some specific areas
determined by the community; for instance the Plaice Box or the Shetland box.

Mardle et al. (2002) have therefore identified three levels of management in the
European Union fisheries, which correspond to different access conditions, different
management tools and different stakeholders: the European Union level, the
national level and the regional level.

The European Union set the total allowable catch through the Council of Minister
and allocates the quotas for some key species to member States according to the
principle of the relative stability, which corresponds to the quantities of fish the
fishermen of the country can have access to and fished within one year.

The management at the national level is done by country organizations including
fisheries administrations, government authorities, fishers associations and other
professional organizations. These institutions decide on the access of their share of
the overall quota. They divide and allocate the country quota to local fishermen
through approaches that may be different from one country to another.
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Local communities or local government authorities can also be in charge of the
management of fisheries resources at the local level.

3.1.4.2 Conservation measures

The technical policy of the community is based on a variety of actions including
technical measures, fisheries access restrictions and fleet reduction schemes.

3.1.4.2.1 Access restrictions (Norway pout box, Shetland box)
The access to waters and resources are restricted in some areas of the European
community waters. These restrictions were established to protect the biologically
sensitive species that are found in the area on the one hand and on the other hand,
to limit the effort on the resource (Karagionnakis, 1995).

In addition, the setting of the Shetland box helped in reaching acceptance of the
equilibrium established between the different fleets and the fishing communities (EC,
2002). Indeed, the development of the stock in this box does not allow any increase
in the fishing effort. The European Commission has therefore maintained the current
restriction on fishing activities so as to keep the balance between the fishing
communities and the fishing fleet.

The Norway pout box, which was introduced in 1986, covered an area of 95,000
km2. It was designed for juveniles stock of haddock, which were produced as by
catch during the massive exploitation of the Norway pout.
However, explicit management for the Norway pout box has not clearly been defined.
The EU and Norway have therefore adopted a precautionary approach by adopting
some technical measures such as closed Norway pout box, minimum mesh size
regulation and by-catch regulation ensuring that the stock is remained high to
provide food to predators (ICES, 2006).
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Further measures limitating the access to the waters other than the Mediterranean
Sea were imposed on Spain and Portugal during their accession in 1985, for a
period up to December 2002 (Karagionnakis, 1995).

All these measures that control “input” to the fishery sector restrict access aimed at
the conservation of the resource; therefore balancing the fishing effort to the
available stock.

3.1.4.2.2 Technical measures
The European community, to ensure the conservation of the resource, has put into
place a variety of technical measures, which, based on scientific advice, covers the
following areas:
•

Regulation on mesh sizes and fishing nets;

•

Regulation on fish sizes that may be retained on board, landed or offer for
sale;

•

Regulation on fishing gear and appliances;

•

Establishment of open, closed areas and seasons;

•

Restriction of access to certain areas for licensed vessels according to their
capacity and sizes;

•

Regulations of time spend at sea for certain type of vessels.

These regulations contained in the Council regulation No 3094/86 of the 7 October
1986 are applied individually or in combination (Karagionnakis, 1995).

The bulk of technical measures have since then undergone some changes in 1996,
aimed at harmonizing the mesh sizes over the whole areas covered by the
regulation; reducing the mandatory discarding; increasing the selectivity of the
fishing gear and to simplify the rules, making them easier to control and monitor.
The, basic rules established in 1986 were not changed (Mardle, 2002).
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The new framework applicable from the 1 January 2000 constitutes some
improvement of fishing practices, particularly in respect of the protection of young
fish. Indeed certain fishing gear, which results in the high mortality of young fish, is
prohibited. This is the case with the drift net banned since the 1st January 2002 ,
following the Council regulation No 850/98, aiming at protecting the juvenile marine
organisms, ensuring therefore the sustainability of the resource. This worldwide ban
for the Community vessels except for the Baltic Sea, according to the European
community was to have a major beneficial effect on the conservation of small
cetaceans and some species of fish (EC, 2002).

The technical measures are not however uniform in the European waters or in all
the EU countries. For instance, in the Baltic Sea there are specific technical
measures that were adopted by the International Baltic Sea Commission including
the seasonal closure to protect the cod and salmon; the establishment of technical
specifications of the fishing gears (meshes sizes, escape windows in trawls). The
measures are expected to contribute to rebuild the stocks.

Similarly, the Council has adopted Regulation No 1624/94 for Mediterranean
fisheries, laying down the specific technical measures for the conservation of
fisheries resources in this area. Additional measures were introduced by the
International Commission for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT), to
manage the blue tuna and the sword fish, including landing sizes, seasonal closures
and restriction on the use of aircraft as aid for fishing operations (EC, 2002, p.10).

Moreover, some individual countries and some local governments have adopted
some specific measures to reinforce in their areas by making the Community
technical measures more stringent. For example, the management unit of the fishing
resources in the English Channel has adopted measures including the increase of
the EC minimum landing size for given species; limits on boat sizes in the district
and temporary fishing closures (Mardle et al., 2002).
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3.1.3.2.3 Fleet reduction scheme
The fishing capacity of the EC is recognized as being above the required rational
exploitation of the available resources, resulting in overexploitation (Symes, 2005).
The European Community has therefore adopted the Multi Guidance Programme for
the fishing fleet (MAGP), a capacity reduction scheme, to ensure that the fishing
capacity and the exploitation rate are consistent with the long term management
objectives (EC, 2003).

The report of the first MAGP III, which covers the period from 1991 to 1997 shows
that the fishing fleet from the EC was reduced by about 15% Gross tonnage (GRT)
and 9.5% in Kilowatts. The implementation by Member States of this input control
scheme was, however, below the global objectives by tonnage and by power
(Malvino, 2002).

The MAGP IV adopted by the commission in 1997 was less ambitious and proposed
a reduction of 5% over a 5-year period. Despite the fact that this objective is less
stringent, it is likely not to be achieved by member states. In fact, the EC reported
that as from the 1st January 2000, the Community fleet was already 17% below the
objective in terms of tonnage and 6% below the objectives in terms of power (EC,
2003).

Consequently, the reduction rate was recognized to be less to counter the
technological development of the fleet resulting from the improvement in technology,
the efficiency of fishing boat or the technological progress of fishing gear.

3.1.5 Total allowable catch and the quotas management system
The European Community system of fisheries management is based on the total
allowable catch (TAC). Along with the quotas system, it is the corner stone of all the
conservation measures of the Common Fisheries Policy (Karagionnakis, 1995).
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The Council Regulation 170/83 of the EC legally established the system, which
controls output into the fisheries, in 1983. The Council of the European Union
establishes yearly the total allowable catch for the major species, including Cod,
Haddock, Whiting, Saithe, Plaice, Mackerel and Herring, based on the scientific
advice from the STECF, after some input from the ICES Advisory Committee on
fisheries management.

The new framework put in place by Regulation 2371/2002 has introduced the
multiannual management plan including recovery plans for stocks outside biological
limit such as hake and cod, to avoid the uncertainty of annual stock assessments
and therefore to assure greater continuity and stability of the management system.

The predetermined decisions or harvesting rules are expected to end the practice
that had resulted in priority being given to avoid restricting fishing that were
politically unpopular in the short term (Stokke et al., 2004). It will as well permit the
fishermen to program their work far ahead in time such as to take a full advantage of
the quota and therefore adopt conservation strategies. However, for the time being,
in the absence of the pre-arranged rules TACs are still set annually.

The agreed overall quota is divided among the member countries according to the
principle of “relative stability”. The relative stability principle, the maintenance of a
fixed quota per stock of the available resource for each Member State in the EU
takes into consideration three key factors:
•

The traditional fishing pattern for the community fleet and the catches for the
1973-1978 period used as a reference point;

•

Certain preferences termed “Hague preference” to applied to certain
fishermen in some regions, where there were and still are few jobs
opportunities for alternative employment;

•

The losses suffered by the member States fishing vessels in third countries
after the introduction of the 200 nautical miles EEZ.
Karagiannakos, 1995, p.236
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Mardle et al. (2002) consider, however, that the most important key factor for the
relative stability is historic participation in the fishery concerned. For the future
allocation of quota, the distribution of 1982 was to be the “reference allocation”,
which was made resilient to cope with the changes in the fish stock population and
the economic parameter of the fishing industry.

Despite this, some quota trade does exist during the process of quota allocation,
showing therefore one of the EC major concerns of the concept of relative stability in
the common market arena (Newell, G. et al., 2005).

Similarly, the enlargement of the EC in 2004 from 15 to 25 Member States and the
probable further expansion to 28 with the accession of Bulgaria, Romania and
Turkey, will render the distribution of quotas among states more complex (Symes,
2005).

The quota decided for each Member State is thereafter distributed to their various
fishermen according to criteria that are specific to each country.

Malvido et al. (2002) while describing the way in which the fishing rights are
allocated to national fishermen, in the countries whose fleets work in the Community
Atlantic waters including Portugal, France Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden,
Finland and Ireland, argues that the system of resource management in most of
them is centralized and interventionist, since the authority principle is generally used
to allocate quotas decided in Brussels.
The Government agencies decide both on what the TAC and the license allocation
criteria are for fishermen, in such a way that they cannot modify the initial allocation.
Each fisherman just has to catch his quota in the fishing ground granted in his
license.
This approach is slightly different for Spain, where the fishing rights, right of access
(measured in fishing days) and quotas although given by the government agencies
can be transferred.
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3.2

Effectiveness of the management approaches

The tools to manage the Community fisheries resources are many and varied
including the setting up of the total allowable catch and the quotas management
system, the access limitations and technical measures, the fleet policy and the
recovery and management plans; but how effective are these measures to achieve
the objective of resource conservation ensuring therefore the sustainability of the
activity? The effectiveness criteria therefore allow the comparison between the
projected and the actual outcomes and the analysis of the problems arising from the
implementation of a given management measure (Boude et al., 2001).

3.2.1 TACs and quota management system

The Council, based on scientific advice produced by the Scientific Technical and
Economic Committee of Fisheries (STECF) of the Commission after consultation
with ICES Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management (ACFM) that produce
scientific advice to the European Commission, sets the TACs annually.

However, the overall quotas agreed on do not all the time reflect the scientific
advice, as they are almost always set beyond the level of the advice. This fact is
well shown in the study conducted by Karagiannakos in 1995, who after comparing
the recommended TACs, the agreed TACs, the catches and the biomass for the
major demersal species of the north sea for the period from 1980 to 1994, shows
that the agreed TAC do not follow the recommended TAC and is almost all the time
set above it for all the species under consideration including Cod, Haddock, Saithe,
Whiting and Sole. He also found that the catches follow the biomass rather than the
recommended TACs. He concluded that the TAC system has failed to attain its
conservation objective, which is to maintain the resource for the species concerned
as it does not represent the current catch situation which is more affected by the
condition of the stocks in nature rather than the imposition of catch.
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In addition, the difference between the landings and the agreed TACs displays a
failure of fishermen to comply with the TAC, which diminishes the effectiveness of
the system. The discrepancy between the biomass, the landings and the
recommended TAC is well observed in the Swedish Cod fisheries (Figure 2), where
catch rather the status of the stock.

The fact that the settings of TACs do not follow the recommended TAC is induced
by the political pressure involved; which has lead Boude et al. (2001) to argue that
the CFP has an “unwritten” more important objective, which is to preserve social
peace. In fact, considering the various actors involved, it is often difficult to find
compromise on a proposal; hence the Commission uses its monopoly of initiative to
try and forge compromises around the proposals (Reyntjens and Wilson, 2004).
Moreover, the decision on TACs is supposed to be based on the scientific advice
available, which in turn reflects the actual status of the stocks. The stock
assessment is, however, far from being a precise science taking into consideration
the uncertainty in the fish community interactions, the problem of by-catch, the often
non involvement of the industry in the assessment, the susceptibility of the stock
assessment techniques and the scientist’s working environment.

Daw et al. (2005) have also reported that three types of uncertainty are inherent to
fisheries science: apparently random fluctuation in fishery characteristics;
uncertainty in the parameters that describe the behavior of the fishery and the lack
of the scientific understanding of interactions within ecosystems that control their
behavior. They therefore argue that stock assessment may typically have error
margins of up to 50%.
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Fig 2 Evolution of landings, fish mortality, recruitment and biomass in
Swedish Cod fisheries from 1974 to 2004
Source: Swedish board of Fisheries

In addition, the quota system, which defines the amount of a particular fish to be
landed by a given boat, favors the phenomenon of “high grading”. Fishermen are
encouraged to adopt economic strategies and retain the larger and more valuable
fish in order to maximize the economic benefit of their quotas, increasing therefore
the discards at sea and the production of by-catch (Shepherd, 2003).
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The management of the EU fisheries is done at three levels: the Council for the
setting of TACs; the national authorities for the distribution of national quota to
fishermen and the local level by local government or producers organizations. This
situation of many levels of management has lead Boude et al. (2001) to believe that
the European Union, with the Common Fisheries Policy and the various local or
national access conditions and management schemes, could hamper the
effectiveness of the resource conservation.

Moreover, the different ways in which the access rights are granted has an impact
on the one hand on the enforcement and appropriation of the management
measures by fishermen and on the other hand on the conservation of the resource.
Malvino et al. (2002), while studying the management systems in the European
Union, describe the Common Fisheries Policy as a centralized and interventionist
system, where the initial allocation of operational rights, the right of access and that
of withdrawal are defined by the Commission. For instance, the fisherman, after
receiving his license and his quota, has no instrument to change the initial right
allocation, nor is there a mechanism to take part or have an influence on the design
of this right. The allocation of the resource does not meet the competition or a
cooperative criteria, but it just result from the authority discretion (Malvino et al.,
2002).

In this system the fisherman has no influence on the allocation of rights and
becomes a simple user in a system that is recognized as a top down approach and
do not therefore have any incentive to enforce management measures and adopt
long term management strategies that result in the conservation of the resource (EC,
2002).
The advent of a more representation of fishing sector interests and the possibility of
management at a regional level through the creation of the Regional Advisory
Council (RACs), so as to give to the industry a sense of ownership of the policy
decisions ensuring therefore total adhesion and enforcement in the field may not
give the expected results due to the fact that the RACs do not have any real power
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of decision and fishermen may be less willing to comply with policy decisions
(Symes, 2005, p.260).

3.2.2 Fleet policy and financial support
The European Community, to reverse the overcapacity of its fleet has adopted the
Multi Guidance Programme for the fishing fleet (MAGP); a capacity reduction
scheme, to ensure that the fishing capacity and the exploitation rate are consistent
with the long term management objectives (EC, 2003).

The MAGP III, which covers the period from 1991 to 1997, shows a reduction of
about 15% Gross tonnage (GRT) and 9.5% in Kilowatts of the Community fleet while
the Gulland report recommended a reduction of 40% in fish mortality (Daw et al.,
2005). The implementation by Member States of this input control scheme was,
however, below the global objectives by tonnage and by power (Malvino, 2002).

Further, the MAGP IV adopted by the Commission in 1997 was less ambitious and
proposed a reduction of 5% over a 5-year period. Despite the fact that this objective
is less stringent, it is likely not to be achieved by member states. In fact, the
European Community reported that as from the 1st January 2000, the Community
fleet was already 17% below the objective in terms of tonnage and 6% below the
objectives in terms of power (EC, 2003). Consequently, Symes (2005) has
maintained that the low reduction rate associated with the reluctance of the member
States to implement these policies will be less effective to counter the technological
development of the fleet resulting from the improvement in technology, the efficiency
of fishing boat or the technological progress of fishing gears.

In addition, the future development of the European fishing industry may rather
worsen the situation of the stocks. For instance, under the present FIFG programme
(2000-2006), new vessel construction and the modernization of existing vessels was
to account for Euro 833 million compared to an allocation of Euro 454 million for the
removal of the vessels from the fleet. Symes (2005) has therefore argued that

35

fishing capacity remains significantly above that required for the rational exploitation
of the available resource.

Moreover, with the present difficulties resulting from the increase in the price of the
fuel, a proposal of the European Commission to help EU fishermen install new
engines that use fuel efficiently was tabled to the EU fishing Ministers meeting in
Luxembourg last April 2006 after pressure from the major fishing countries. The
proposal was not, however, approved by the Ministers, claiming that the new engine
will be more efficient and will increase the fishing capacity; jeopardizing therefore
the conservation of an already overexploited European fish Stocks (Kuchler,
SAMUDRA NEWS alert 2 May 2006).
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CHAPTER FOUR
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE GULF OF
GUINEA
4.1

DELIMITATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ZONE

4.1.1 Delimitation
The Gulf of Guinea is located in the narrow protrusion of the eastern Atlantic Ocean
between latitude 20S and 50N and longitude 80W and 120N.

Figure 3 Map showing the Gulf of Guinea countries
Source: Wikepedia map (Retrieved from http:// upload. Wikepedia/ commons/gulf of
guinea)
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The area extends from the northern border of Mauritania to the southern border of
the Namibian Republic, including the islands of Sao Tome and Principe and Cape
Verde; for a coastline of 7600km (Ukwe et al., 2006).

The following West and Central African countries are part of the Gulf of Guinea:
Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote
d´Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Namibia and Islands of Sao Tome
and Principe and Cape Verde (Figure 3).

4.1.2 Oceanography of the zone
The predominant features of this shallow ocean bordering the countries of western
and Central Africa is the Guinea current. The Guinea Current is well defined by Mc
Graw Hill as the counter current, which flows in an easterly direction between the
south and the north equatorial current (as cited by Ukwe et al., 2003).

This implies that the north and the south equatorial currents contribute greatly to the
circulation of waters, which flow in pretty much the way as the major surface winds
(Giwa, 2003).

The northern subsystem of the Gulf of Guinea is thermally instable and is
characterized by intensive seasonal upwelling while the southern half depends on
nutrients inputs originating form land drainage, rivers flows and turbulent diffusions
(Ukwe & al., 2003). Indeed, the southern zone of the gulf receives many rivers that
constitute the Congo basin and feed the area with sediments from coastal erosion.

However, the circulation of waters in the swampy forest inside the creeks on the
coastline is very slow due to the presence of roots of the dominant mangrove
vegetation in the area (Folack, 1995).
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These characteristics make the Gulf of Guinea one of the world’s most productive
marine areas, which is rich in fisheries resources, oil, gas reserves, precious mineral,
and reservoir of marine biodiversity (Ukwe & al., 2003).
The surface temperature of sea in the Gulf of Guinea is generally 10 Celsius warmer
than the air temperature, which is always high. The vertical transport in upwelling
zones and the horizontal water transport in the region can however change this
pattern. The salinity of the water varies between 3.7 % in the high latitudes and 3%
in the equatorial area of the GOG, due the hydrographical input from the rivers.

4.1.3 Main coastal ecosystems and biodiversity
The mangrove forests exist and are scattered along the whole coast of all the
countries of the Gulf of Guinea area. The mangrove forest here is mainly composed
of Rhizophora, Conocarpus and Avicenna species. The most important reserve of
mangrove in Africa is located in the delta of the river Niger in Nigeria. It is ranked the
first largest mangrove area in Africa and the third largest in the world and can be up
to 50km wide.

The mangrove ecosystem constitutes a very important spawning area and is the
breeding grounds for many demersal and shrimp species as well as for many trans
boundary fish species (Ukwe & al., 2003). They are however regressing all over the
area. A study conducted in Cameroon by Tsiotsop (2002) show that due to the
cutting down of the mangrove forest related to urbanization and its use as a fuel
food, 1,100 ha are being destroyed every year loosing therefore its important
biological role including the

reproduction and spawning zones for the major

commercial fishes and the protection of coastal areas. He reported that this
depreciation rate is far less than what is observed in Guinea Republic with 22,500
ha per year, displaying therefore the gravity of the situation.

In addition to the mangroves, some coral formations are distributed along the coast
of some Central and West African countries. They occur in Sierra Leone, Liberia,
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Cote d´Ivoire, Ghana, Gabon and around the island of Sao Tome and Bioko (GIWA,
2003).

Besides, the region has a high biological value with the presence of some
endangered marine mammal species classified in the red list of the UICN such as
the African manatee, the Humpbacked dolphin and four over the seven remaining
turtle species in the world that use to select places along the coastline to lay eggs
(Ukwe & al., 2003).

4.1.4 Fisheries resources
The Gulf of Guinea receives sediments from the vast river network and from coastal
erosion. These characteristics, associated with the seasonal upwelling in the
northern part of the region make it a zone rich in fisheries resources and a precious
reservoir of marine biodiversity.

As a result, the fishing industry is well developed in the GOG, exploiting locally
important and migratory stocks and supports the economy of most of the countries
in the area. Table 1 show that the fisheries sector participates in the GDP of all the
countries of the region. This contribution varies from country to country depending
on the relative importance of the water body.

The contribution of the sector to the GDP is very low in inland countries such as
Burkina Faso (0.1%), and relatively high in countries with extensive EEZ such as
Senegal, Mauritania, the Gambia and Sao Tome; where the sector produces more
than 5% of the country’s wealth and constitutes more than 20% of the primary sector
(See figure 1).

Dahou, K. & al. (2002) have reported that in Senegal the fishing sector is the first
and the most important source of foreign currencies. This is also the case with the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Indeed as clearly shown in table 1, the commercial
balance between export and import of fishing products is by far positive for Senegal,
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Mauritania and Gabon, displaying therefore the important role of the sector as a
source of foreign income. These countries and many others of the GOG zone have
declared extensive EEZ; which are highly rich in fisheries resources. Mauritania,
Gabon and Sao Tome have EEZ of more than 200,000 km2 (table 1); where a large
fishing fleet under fisheries agreements exploits large banks of transboundary and
high migratory fish species including tuna, herring, anchovy, crustaceans and
flatfishes (GIWA, 2003).
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Figure 4: Fisheries sector in the Gulf of Guinea countries national economy (2002)
Source: SFLP/ FAO (2006)
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Figure 5: Fish catches statistics in the Gulf of Guinea
Source: Adapted from FAO (2005)

Between 1994 and 2003, the overall catches in the countries of GOG ranged from
1,590,612 to 2,196,176 tonnes, with the highest catches in 1999 and 2003 (Table 2).
These figures generally show an increasing trend with occasional variations.
However, the production became more stable from 1998, when it exceeded 2 million
tons (Figure 2).

The production of marine fishes has almost followed the same pattern. During the
same period of time, the annual fish catch of the marine zone ranged between
1,111,682 and 1,534,475 tonnes (Table 3).
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Table 1: Fisheries data and contribution to the national economies of GOG countries

Context
socioeconomic 1

Benin

Burkina
Faso

Cameroun

Cap Verde

Congo

Côte
d’Ivoire

Gabon

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Mali

Mauritania

Saõ Tome

Senegal

GDP/capita (US$)

1 070

1 100

2 000

5 000

980

1 520

6 590

1 690

2 130

2 100

930

2 220

1 317

1 580

GNP/ capita (US$)

380

240

610

1 060

690

700

3 950

340

390

540

250

410

280

530

IDH

0,42

0,30

0,50

0,717

0,49

0,40

0,65

0,45

0,57

0,42

0,33

0,46

0,65

0,44

Life expectancy

51

46

47

70

48

41

57

54

58

49

48

52

70

53

Pop/.pov.level

33 %

45 %

40 %

n.d.

n.d.

37 %

n.d.

64 %

39 %

40 %

64 %

46 %

n.d.

33 %

n.d.

60 000

204 600

213 000

10 500

110 000

n.d.

0

230 000

160 000

n.d.

Context
geographic

EEZ (km²)

20 000

0

n.d.

Cont shelf. (km²)

3 100

0

14 000

5 394

10 000

12 000

40 600

4 000

24 300

56 000

0

36 000

1 460

27 600

316

1 220

n.d.

n.d.

10 000

6 037

10 000

11

8 746

n.d.

>20 909

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

8 061

43 456

77 366

43 986

44 496

429 310

142 620

103 803

81 544

3 820

426 831

n.d.

47 %

20 %

24 %

n.d.

19 %

3,5 %

100 %

6%

n.d.

n.d.

Area cont wat (km²)
Prod° domestic
(tonnes)
Prod° continental

37 136

11 700

49 %

100 %

180 000
(2003)
41 %

(1 000 $)

45 958
1,11 $/kg

8 427
0,72 $/kg

168 000
0,96 $/kg

16 229
2,01 $/kg

63 476
1,46 $/kg

90 704
1,30 $/kg

58 552
1,40 $/kg

114 241
2,57 $/kg

570 323
1,32 $/kg

59 8940

152 455
1,47 $/kg

n.d.

5 572
1,29 $/kg

179 062
0,42 $/kg

… fisheries
continental

36 284
1,15 $/kg

8 026
0,72 $/kg

72 032
0,96 $/kg

n.d.

32 328

n.d.

9 543
1,12 $/kg

n.d.

69 437
0,90 $/kg

n.d.

145 195
1,47 $/kg

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

… fisheries maritime
artisanal

6 604
0,87 $/kg

n.d.

0,61 $/kg

n.d.

13 071

n.d.

19 306
0,86 $/kg

95 266
2,95 $/kg

327 253
1,71 $/kg

52 901

n.d.

n.d.

99 %

n.d.

Exportat° (1000 $)

1 607

7

953

1 402

2 004

129 890

15 297

2 734

69 619

9 407

354

69 273

6 113

269 513

Value Production
Food security

Fish trade
2000–2002

National
wealth

Importat° (1000 $)
Balance com.
Dispo/capita(kg/an)
Value added
(1 000 $)
…fisheries artis.

7 046

1 582

29 215

821

19 984

148 265

7 059

681

94 701

5 506

2 135

615

206

2 066

- 5 439
8,8

- 1 575
2,3

- 18 375
15

- 25 082
29,7

3 901
12,8

- 1 781
8,3

68 658
11,5

5 907
13,7

267 447
29,2

93 299

203 451

40 763

305 755

54 470

144 833

58 934

4 160

261 973

~ 98 %

100 %

43,4 %

60,2 %

8 238
44,1
82 097
(2001)
65,8 %

2 053
23,5

12 391

581
21,9
28 545
(2003)

- 17 980
18,3

67 324

- 28 262
13,6
191 125
(2003)
44,0 %

88,3 %

77 %

87,3 %

100 %

42,2 %

88 %

…transformation.

10,5 %

15,9 %

14,1 %

4,6 %

9,7 %

35,1 %

3,9 %

3,7 %

Cont. fisheries /GDP

2,9 %

0,4 %

1,7 %

3,9 %

2,7 %

1,5 %

1,5 %

5,7 %

3%

1,8 %

4%

5,3 %

5,2 %

11,3 %
4,1 %

Fish / sect prim 2

7,8 %

1,25 %

4,0 %

10,8 %

22,9 %

6%

14 %

17,3 %

5%

8,2 %

8,9 %

22 %

19,2 %

24,1 %

Cont. State budget 3

n.d.

Investment
Employ./ total pop

n.d.

n.d.

274 k$

8 003 k$

7 169 k$

10 500 k$

1 247 k$

7 568 k$

12 006 k$

43 k$ +
taxes
n.d.

13 606 k$

n.d.

6 528 k$

6 883 k$

12 623 k$

n.d.

n.d.

10 %

>1%

1,25 %

14,6 %

7,9 %

> 0,15 %

3,4 %

15,4 %

10 %

1

Human development report (2004), UNDP. The data are from 2002.
The primary sector includes products values added from agriculture, livestock, hunting, fisheries, and aquaculture.
3
The two types of available contributions : fishing licenses and commercial taxes
2
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n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

31,5 k$ +
taxes
>8 582 k$

15 861 k$

16 071

n.d.

1,6 %

2,7 %

1,3 %

3,3 %

> 1%

(Source: Adapted from SFLP/ FAO (2006))

Therefore, the steady increasing annual pattern observed on the overall production
is justified by the continental artisanal catches, which has gain a relative importance
in the zone with the exploitation of the rich continental hydrology (Figure2). In fact,
in addition to large natural and artificial lakes, large river basins are present in each
country of the zone, in which fisheries activities are being developed (GIWA, 2003).

The development of inland fishing is gaining some importance in countries such as
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon or the Republic of Congo in which the
production of this sector is higher than that of the maritime sub sector. In the
Democratic Republic of Congo for instance, the production of the continental
fisheries accounts for 98% of the total fish production of the country with more than
200 thousands tonnes of fresh fishes catches annually. In Cameroon as well, the
production of the continental fisheries has steadily increased over years and
accounts for 47% of the country total production in 2003 (Table1).

Despite the importance of the sector for the Gulf of Guinea countries, the potential of
fishery resources in the area is not well known. The last stock assessment was
carried out between June and July 2006 in the GOG zone, by the Norwegian
scientific boat NANSEN. The result of this stock assessment, which covers almost
all the countries of the Gulf of Guinea from Ghana to the Congo Republic, is yet to
be published.

However, a former survey conducted in 1990 to assess the resources of the Gulf of
Guinea maritime zone had shown that the coastal area of the region although poor
in demersal commercial fish stocks was rich in small pelagic species including
Sardinella, Ethmalosa, Anchovy ssp (FAO; 1991). This relative poverty of the zone
as compared with other fishing zones in Africa is related interalia to its
oceanography. The zone witnesses a high thermo cline, which prevents the nutrient
rich deep water to mix with the surface water, lessening therefore the primary
productivity (Linden, 2006).
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Table 2: Marine and fresh water fish catches (tonnes) in the GOG countries from 1994-2003

Country
Benin
Cameroun
Congo DR
Congo R
Ivory
coast
Eq Guinea
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea B
Liberia
Nigeria
Sao Tome
Sierra L
Togo
Mauritania
Senegal
TOTAL

1994
39923
79000
155897
42664

1995
44379
94131
158627
45776

1996
42175
98400
163010
45473

1997
43785
102000
162211
38082

1998
42139
106800
178041
42955

1999
40436
110000
208448
43509

2000
32324
112109
209300
45958

2001
38415
111031
214600
48830

2002
40663
120135
220000
51003

2003
41893
107801
220000
52373

73978
5069
31015
335437
63800
6000
7721
267059
3391
62439
13052
51746
352421
1590612

70139
2306
40437
352844
67860
6328
8829
349482
3565
64870
12201
53147
354617
1729538

69168
5040
46113
476733
63360
7000
8308
337993
3980
67304
15098
60324
411759
1921238

64169
6090
43584
447088
62441
7250
8580
387923
3338
72628
14290
57756
457366
1978581

69572
6005
53609
442641
69764
6000
10830
463024
3477
63065
16655
61660
403872
2040109

74365
7001
51143
492776
87314
5000
15472
455628
3756
59407
22924
76026
412125
2165330

75772
3634
47470
452070
91513
5000
11726
441377
3500
74730
22277
80849
402047
2111656

73556
3500
42871
447681
105402
5000
11286
452146
3400
75210
23163
84881
403202
2144174

79743
3500
40875
371178
92755
5000
11500
481056
3300
82990
20946
78902
375824
2079370

68903
3500
44775
390756
118845
5000
11300
475162
3283
96926
27485
80000
448174
2196176

(Source:FAO,2005)
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Seasonal upwelling does occurs in the upper area of the GOG between July to
September; however limited in scale due to the influx of warm, low salinity water
originating from the Bay of Biafra and the Guinea coast (GIWA, 2003).

This situation favors the development of small-scale artisanal fisheries that exploit
small pelagic species. Indeed, the majority of the marine production is done by
artisanal fishermen, whose catches account for 60% of the overall landings in the
zone (Ukwe & al., 2003). The figure is rather high in Cameroon for instance; where
the production of the artisanal fishermen have accounted for 95% of the total
production of fish in the country during 2003 (MINEPIA, 2004).

Another characteristic of the fisheries in the continental shelves of the Gulf of
Guinea is coastal fish assemblage (croackers), located principally in nutrient-rich
estuarine and inshore areas (Koranteng, 2002). Moreover, a study conducted by
Folack (1995) describes GOG maritime resources as a multispecific type
characterized many commercial species of fishes living together in the same areas.
Consequently, the quantity of non-targeted fishes caught in the fishing gear as bycatch is rather high for both the artisanal and industrial fisheries.

A study conducted by Njifounjou et al. (1999), assessing the level of by-catch and
discards in shrimp trawling in Cameroon concludes that the activity produce more
than 60% of by-catch, that are then generally discarded into the sea. This production
of by-catch is not only limited to the industrial but also extends to the small scale
fisheries where gear with small mesh sizes are used and catch immature and small
fish species.

Another characteristic of the Gulf of Guinea is that some areas of the coastal
shallow water constitute a mixed zone use by many commercial species as nursery
and breeding areas. Moses, B. (1992) maintains after analyzing the distribution of
the fishes in the zone that fisheries resources in the coastal waters of the Gulf of
Guinea are concentrated between the depths of 20 to 40 meters and are constituted
of a mix of young and adult animals.
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Table 3 Marine fish catches (tonnes) in the gulf of Guinea countries 1994-2003

Country
Benin
Cameroun
Congo DR
Congo R
Ivory
coast
Eq
Guinea
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea B
Liberia
Nigeria
Sao Tome
Sierra L
Togo
Mauritania
Senegal
TOTAL

1994
7216
52000
3780
17912

1995
6930
64131
3876
18965

1996
7982
63400
3973
19600

1997
10914
62000
3844
19095

1998
10361
61800
3954
17500

1999
8542
60000
3954
18241

2000
5924
57109
4300
20520

2001
8415
58531
4600
22729

2002
10670
55135
5000
25510

2003
11893
52801
5000
26346

58374

58854

57606

52137

57071

63709

65270

62926

55900

45903

4369
26515
280737
60000
5750
3721
163259
3391
47439
8052
46746
322421
1111682

1856
32789
292844
64760
6078
4829
231579
3565
49870
7203
48147
323617
1219893

4140
36680
403153
60580
6750
3408
248472
3980
52804
10098
55324
388759
1426709

5240
34143
377088
58841
7000
4580
294279
3338
58128
9290
52756
426366
1479039

5035
44609
368141
65764
5800
6830
324004
3477
48875
11655
56660
382872
1474408

5900
41143
418276
83314
4800
11472
316235
3756
44927
17924
71026
378125
1551344

2558
37053
370441
87513
4800
7726
309062
3500
60730
17277
75849
379579
1509211

2500
33021
366849
101227
4800
7286
297971
3400
61210
18163
79881
383202
1516711

2500
31475
296678
87358
4800
7500
293823
3300
68990
15946
73902
355824
1394311

2500
35269
315756
114845
4800
7300
300194
3283
82926
22485
75000
428174
1534475

(Source: FAO, 2005)
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This clearly shows that a coastal narrow zone in the Gulf of Guinea supports the fish
stock and receives the majority of the fishing effort.

Djama T. (1992) while discussing the interaction between artisanal and industrial
fishermen echoes the same characteristics of the fisheries in the area. He observes
that the conflict between artisanal and industrial fishing in the coastal area of the
Gulf of Guinea stems from the fact that they compete in the same fishing grounds.
These grounds are located near the shore in shallow waters. This characteristic
implies that any unsustainable fishing method and gears will automatically destroy
young and adult animals; leading to the depletion of the fishing resources as it may
jeopardize their renewal capacity.

The fishing resources in the Gulf of Guinea are already recognized as being under
extreme pressure. The presence of the offshore commercial fishing fleet as well as
the important artisanal sub sector has placed fisheries at risk of collapse (Ukwe et
al., 2003).

Although the catch statistics show a steady increase in production during the last
decade in the Gulf of Guinea countries (Figure 2) in reality there is an important shift
in their composition.

Indeed, the analysis of landings revels that the species

diversity and the average body total length of most important fish assemblages have
declined in the zone while the catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is exceeding
sustainable yield in some countries (Ajayi, 1998; Ukwe et al., 2006). In Cameroon
for instance, the quantity of big sizes of commercial high valued fish such as
Scianides ssp, flat fish and shrimps has decreased over time to constitute a
relatively small part of the landings, less than 5% (MINEPIA; 2003).

The causes of the decrease of the catch value are related to the unsustainable
fishing practices, which include the use of fishing gear with small mesh sizes; the
use of poison such as pesticides and the use of explosives to catch fish; as well as
inadequate fisheries management approaches (GIWA, 2003).
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4.2

Management measures

The management of the fisheries resource in the Gulf of Guinea countries is done
by fisheries authorities of individual countries in the waters under their jurisdiction.
There is however a difference in approaches according to the zones of the Sea
under consideration: the coastal zone or the EEZ.

4.2.1 Management in the coastal zone
Garcia (2002) while studying the evolution of fishing management approaches over
years maintained that fisheries management in the Gulf of Guinea coastal waters is
done by each country in their areas of jurisdiction and is extensively based on the
“input limitation scheme”, where fishing effort is controlled through licenses.

4.2.1.1

Access

The maritime fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea are not open access resources; the
individual countries regulate the access to ensure their sustainability. The access to
coastal fisheries grounds in all the countries of the zone is subject to the
authorization granted by the fisheries authorities. These authorizations include
fishing permits and fishing licenses (Table 4).

The condition of access differs according to the class of fisheries, the countries, and
the fishing zone to be exploited. Fishing activities in the Gulf of Guinea are divided
into two main categories including artisanal fishing and industrial fishing (Table 4).
Some countries however distinguish an intermediary third category, which is the
semi industrial fishing. This is the case for the Republic of Cameroon, Gabon and
the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

The distinction between these categories differs from one country to another and is
generally based on the power of the vessel and the fishing techniques used.
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Table 4: Conditions of access to GOG fisheries

Country

Artisanal fisheries

Benin

Fishing permit
(5 nautical mile)

Guinea Bissau

Fishing permit
( up to 60 HP)

Semi-industrial
fisheries
_

Industrial fisheries

_

. License
(more 100 HP)

E EZ

Fishing license
.demersal fish

-

Fishing agreements
EU, China, ivory
coast,

Licence
. Demersal species
Cote d´Ivoire

Fishing permit

_

_

. Shrimp
. Tuna ,sardine
-

Cameroon

Fishing permit

Fishing

permit

(less 40 HP)

( more 40 HP)

License
Fish trawler
Shrimp trawler

3nautical mile
-

Licenses

Fishing permit

-

demersal trawler

Congo

Shrimp trawlers
pelagic (sardine)
Fishing agreement

Mauritania

Fishing permit

Fishing permit

License (nationals)

UE (90%)

Cephalopods

Russsia,

Polyvalent demersal

Lituania

Ukraine,

Fishing agreements
Cap vert

Fishing permit

Licenses (nationals)
-

EU (90%)

Demersal

Japan ,Mauritania

pelagic

Senegal
Guinea Bissau
Fishing

Gabon

Fishing permit

Fishing permit

-Free
Nigeria

(Up to 5miles)

_

EU

Demersal, pelagic

Japan

Licenses

Fishing licenses

Fish trawlers

Tuna

Shrimp trawler
License
Togo

Guinea

Fishing permit

-

-

demersal trawler

Free

License

(up to 12 miles)

Fishing trawlers

-

Source: Compiled by the author (based on FAO data)
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agreement

License

-

The industrial fisheries involve the use of large fishing boats powered with inboard
engines using mechanic active fishing gears such as the bottom trawls and purse
seine.

Those boats generally have onboard conservation equipments including

deep freezers and cold store rooms to support a long period at sea.

The artisanal fisheries on the other hand use small canoes powered or not by an
outboard engine and using passive fishing gears such as gillnets and traps. The
power of the outboard engine in that case might be different from one country to
another. For instance, small boats powered with outboard engines of less than 60
horse power (HP) are classified in the artisanal fisheries sub sector in Guinea
Bissau; whereas the maximum engine power required to be classified in the
artisanal fisheries in Cameroon is 40 HP (Table 4).

In between these two categories, some countries including Mauritania, Cameroon
and Gabon have created an intermediary semi industrial fisheries class. For
instance, in Cameroon small boats powered by an outboard engine of 40 HP or
more are classified into this category. Similarly, a small fishing boat powered with
outboard engine of less than 40 HP but using active fishing techniques is also
classify into this category. For example, the “Awasha” fishing boat, which is a
traditional wooden or plank made fishing canoe of 18 to 22m long, 2 to 3m wide,
operated by 20 to 23 men and propelled by a 40 HP outboard engine. The gear use
is the purse seine and the main species targeted are Ethmalosa fimbriata, Sardinella
madarensis and other small pelagic species (Njifounjou, 1996).

In Cameroon and Gabon the “awasha” are generally operated by fishermen from
Nigeria or those from Ghana as the local fishermen do not handle this technique
very well.

The access to fisheries in the coastal zone of the Gulf of Guinea countries are in the
majority of cases subject to the authorization of the government authorities in the
form of a fishing permit in the case of artisanal and semi industrial fisheries and a
fishing license in the case of industrial fisheries.
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The access by artisanal fishers to fisheries of almost all the countries of the zone is
subject to the fishing permit, which is delivered by the fisheries authorities. However,
two countries in the GOG have free access to national artisanal fishermen, Nigeria
and the Guinea Republic (Table 4). The situation is changing in Guinea, for instance,
where foreign artisanal fishermen from Senegal and Ghana, who exploit high valued
fish, are required as from 2005 to get fishing licenses (FAO, 2006).

The industrial fishing case is different. The access of the industrial fishing vessels to
the fishing grounds is subject to the delivery of a fishing license in all the countries of
the Gulf of Guinea. The fishing licenses are, however, different depending on the
target species, the fishing gear used and the country (Table 4).

4.2.1.2

Access restriction

The access to waters and resources are restricted in some areas of the Gulf of
Guinea. These restrictive aims are on the one hand to ensure the sustainability
management of fisheries resources by protecting the spawning and the growing
zone and on the other hand to protect the interests of the artisanal fishermen who
generally have less means to compete with industrial fishermen.

Many countries of the zone have therefore prohibited the trawling activities of the
industrial fishermen to a certain zone from the shoreline, which correspond to the
exclusive zone allocated to the artisanal fishermen. The dimension of this area is
different from one country to another. For instance, in the Guinea Republic the zone
is 12 nautical miles wide, while it is 5 nautical miles in Benin and Nigeria and 7 miles
for Senegal (FAO, 2004). Furthermore, the Cameroonian fisheries Law clearly
states that trawling activities are prohibited within the three nautical miles from the
shore exclusively reserved for the artisanal fishermen.

However, the countries generally encounter some difficulties in the enforcement of
the access restriction measures. The characteristics of the Gulf of Guinea coastal
waters show that the highly productive areas are located, in shallow water near the
shore, which in most countries is the zone reserved for artisanal fishermen (Djama,
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1992). The industrial vessels in the search of more productive area usually make
incursions into this zone exclusively reserved for artisanal fisheries in profound
violation of the Law resulting in the destruction of artisanal fishermen gear resulting
in conflicts.

4.2.1.3

Technical conservation measures

The Gulf of Guinea countries, to ensure the conservation of the fisheries resources
have adopted a variety of technical measures, which include:
•

Regulation on mesh sizes and fishing nets;

•

Regulation on fish sizes to be landed

•

Regulation on fishing gear and appliances;

•

Establishment of open, closed areas and seasons;

•

Restriction of access to certain areas for licensed vessels according to their
capacity and sizes;

•

Prohibition of certain types of fishing methods and gear.

There is not however a common agreement on the effects of various gears or fishing
methods on the marine fisheries among countries of the GOG region. For instance,
the twin trawling system is recognized as being a bad-fishing method for the
conservation of the resource and therefore is banned in all the countries waters;
whereas the purse seine banned in the Republique of Guinea are allowed in other
countries.
This difference may be due to the specificity of the coastal zone in the various
countries. The Gulf of Guinea coastal areas is very shallow and in the countries
such as the Guinea Republic the average depth for almost 70% of the continental
shelf is 40m (FAO, 2000). In that case, some fishing gear and methods will be very
destructive for the marine resources and environment.
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Similarly, the mesh sizes for the same gear might be different among countries. For
instance, the maximum mesh size allowed for the bottom gillnet in Guinea is limited
to 35mm, while it is of 40 mm in Cameroon.

The closed seasons and areas are well established in fisheries regulations of the
GOG countries, so as to ensure the reproduction of the target species. However,
some countries such as Guinea have chosen not to have closed seasons in relation
to the specificity of the oceanography of their coastal zone, which witness recurrent
upwelling phenomenon; consequently, can support fishing activities all year round
(FAO, 2005). Conversely, many countries including Senegal, Mauritania or Cote
d´Ivoire, Gabon have established and are respecting the closed seasons, periods
within which all the fishing activities in the zone under consideration are banned.
These periods vary from one country to another and may extend from 2 to 4 months.
In Gabon for instance, the closed season for the shrimps is from the 1st January to
30th April and that of the sardines (Ethmalosa fimbriata) from the 1st September to
the 31st October (Ngwe, A., 2006).

Another group of countries have put in place regulations on closed seasons, which
are not yet implemented. This is the case in Cameroon where the Law establishes
the closed seasons in principle; however, its application is yet to be undertaken as
there is no clear determination of the zones as well as the periods. This lack in
regulation may be due to the absence of the preliminary work of the research to
determine the reproduction period of the target species and the specific zones of
reproduction.

Another tool used by fisheries managers of the Gulf of Guinea countries to control
the activities of the industrial fishing fleet is the use of Monitoring, Control and
Surveillance System (MCS). They include the installment of telemetric systems on
board licensed vessels, to monitor their movements and therefore ensure that they
respect the fishing zones and to embark fishing observers on board vessels.

According to Caddy F. et al. (2001) the requirement to embark scientific observers
as well as the requirement to install compulsory telemetric systems involving direct

54

monitoring via satellite of fishing operations via telemetric systems installed into
fishing vessels has progressively become a condition for licensing. This move has
already been made by the Gulf of Guinea countries where control of fishing activities
via satellite and the use of in board fisheries controllers have been adopted and
included in the countries fisheries regulations. In Cameroon for instance, a
Ministerial decision signed in December 2005 made compulsory the installation of
telemetric tools, which is the Argos systems as a requirement to be granted a fishing
license.

The control of fishing activities is less difficult in coastal waters near the shore with
the application of technical measures; however, the situation in the EEZs of the
GOG countries is rather complicated.

4.2.2 Management in the EEZ: fisheries agreements

Some of the countries of the GULF of Guinea have declared Exclusive Economic
Zones (See Table 1), rich in fisheries resources. Due to the lack of capacity from the
coastal state, foreign fleets from Europe and Asia generally undertake the
exploitation of these resources under fisheries agreements.

The coastal States generally sign individually agreements with their foreign partners
in the form of fishing rights and they receive financial compensations in return. The
financial compensations are sometimes very important for the economies of these
countries. In fact, the collection of the licenses fees from the European Community
for instance, in the form of a single lump may give to the country a good amount of
foreign currency that can be used in the State emergency expenditures such as the
payment of salaries of the country officials. It was shown by Kaczynski (2002) that
the total amount of compensation paid by the European Community to the Gulf of
Guinea states within the last 25 year period until 2006 is USD 674 million.
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The agreements signed between GOG countries and their European or Asian
partners are generally based on catch capacity in the form of gross tonnage and do
not contain catch quotas.

4.3

Effectiveness of the management measures

4.3.1 Effectiveness of the management measures in the coastal areas
4.3.1.1

Access restriction

The characteristics of fisheries in the GOG coastal areas shows that the coastal
assemblages of some target species mainly Croackers are located in the estuarine
and inshore areas (Koranteng, 2002). Moreover, the zone is rich in many
commercial species of mix adult and young fish living together in the same areas in
depth (Folack, 1995; Moses, 1992). Consequently, the areas restriction measure
prohibiting the trawling activities in areas near the shore may successfully contribute
to the conservation of the resources.

However, this area limitation is not fully enforced in almost all of the countries of the
zone. Incursions of fishing trawlers inside the prohibited zone, exclusively reserved
to the artisanal fishermen are reported in most countries, resulting in loss of fishing
gears, loss of canoes and even loss of lives (Zantou, P., 2006; Diallo, M. et al., 2003;
Njama, 1992).

4.3.1.2

Technical conservative measures

This lack of enforcement and compliance with this management measures have
along with other factors contributed to the decline of coastal fisheries in the zone
The countries of the GOG, to ensure the conservation of the resources in the
coastal areas have adopted a bulk of technical measures, including the prohibition
of destructive fishing methods and practices such as the use of pesticide and blast
fishing; the limitation of the mesh and the fish to be landed sizes and the closed
areas and season. These technical measures are not, however, comply with by the
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fishermen. In fact, the small scale fishermen have rather adopted destructive fishing
practices including the undersize meshes, poisoning and blast fishing (Ukwe et al.,
2006).

The consequence of non enforcement of the management measures has led to the
overexploitation of the resource, resulting in a progressive decline of commercially
valuable fish. Ukwe et al. (2006) indicate that in some countries of the GOG, the
artisanal as well as the industrial commercial fisheries are about to or have already
exceeded the point of sustainability.

Therefore, the management measures in the coastal areas are not effective not
because they do not in principle address the issue of resource conservation; but
rather, because they are not enforced and comply with by both the artisanal and
industrial fishers.

4.3.2 Effectiveness of fisheries agreements
The agreements signed between the GOG countries and their European or Asian
partners for the exploitation of the fishing resources in their EEZs are based on
catch capacity and do not contain catch quotas (Kaczynski, 2002).
The access rights are established based on the vessel size measured into gross
registered tonnage (GRT), which can lead to over harvesting when it is well known
that the capacity of a vessel to fish is not related to its GRT, but rather to the
technology and the gears used. Therefore, the fisheries agreements promote
excessive pressure on the resources that heavily harm the marine resources in the
region (Ukwe et al., 2006). The fact that countries do not have the capacity to
monitor the activities in their EEZs is worsening situation.
Further, in most of the agreements, the EU negotiates the right to increase the
harvesting capacity without any consent of the coastal State. This situation,
associate to the fact that there is no scientific research undertaken prior to the
access negotiations to ensure that the fishing effort fixed in the agreement may be
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adequate for the conservation of the resource, have result into a degradation of fish
stock in the GOG countries EEZs (Kaczynski, 2002). Significant changes towards
smaller fish size classes have been observed in the offshore demersal and pelagic
species usually exploited by foreign fishing fleet under agreements, related interalia
to the pressure on the offshore resources by the foreign trawlers (Fonteneau et al.,
1999).
The result of these “favorable” fisheries agreements, driven by the poverty of the
GOG countries, has led to over harvesting, which have hampered the stock and
diminish the attractiveness of the EEZs. For example, Senegal has had favorable
fisheries cooperation with the European Union for more than 15 years including
attractive access and less restrictions. The result is a negative impact on both the
environment and the society with a depleted stock, a disrupted artisanal fisheries
and a substantial decrease in access fees (Kaczynski, 2002).

Consequently, the fisheries agreements signed between the Gulf of Guinea
countries and their European, or Asian partners do not in reality favor the
conservation of the resource.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PERCEPTIONS OF RESOURCE USERS TOWARDS
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT MEASURES AND ENFORCEMENT

5.1

Fishermen perception towards fisheries management in the GOG

There are many ways to manage fisheries, but the approach adopted by the Gulf of
Guinea countries is a combination of measures that regulate the input into the
fishery including licenses and fishing permits, limits on areas and time, limits on
gears and limits on mesh and fish sizes. These measures, put in place by the policy
maker may be perceived differently by the stakeholders and this perception may
influence the level of enforcement.

5.1.1 Perceptions towards areas

The Gulf of Guinea countries, to ensure the sustainable exploitation of their living
marine resources have enacted areas restriction regulations, which prohibit
industrial commercial vessel’s activities in a certain zone close to the shore (Table
4).
In Cameroon for instance, the Law No 94/ 01 of the 20 January 1994, and its Decree
of application No 95/413/ PM of the 20th June 1995, which regulate fisheries
activities, have prohibited trawling activities within the three nautical miles from the
shore, to protect the fisheries resources; dedicating, therefore, this zone to the
artisanal fishermen. This area restriction regulation is not fully enforced by industrial
trawlers, who usually make incursions into these zones, especially at night, resulting
into the destruction of fishermen gears and conflicts. In fact, the fishermen of the
four fishing villages, interviewed complained about the industrial trawlers destroying
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their fishing nets and cutting down their lines inside the three nautical-miles;
confirming therefore that the industrial fishers usually breach that Law.
The face to face discussions with the representative of fishermen associations in the
four Cameroonian fishing villages where the study was conducted shows that all the
fishermen (artisanal and industrial), do agree with this management decision.

However, there is a difference in perception of the rationale of the decision between
artisanal and commercial industrial fishermen.

For most of the artisanal fishers, the decision of the Government to prohibit the
trawling activities inside the three nautical zones is to protect the juveniles’ fish and
the fish spawning zone. This was clearly points out by the Nigerians fishermen
representative in “Limbe” fishing village who maintained that:

The Government decision to prohibit the activities of the big fish trawlers near
the coast is good, it protect small fish being destroyed by those trawlers.
The fish will then grow and we and our sons and their sons will continue
the activity and still catch fish”.

Effiong, E., Nigerian fisherman, (Limbe, 10/07/2006)

This intervention also displays the social dimension of such a decision, which is to
protect the artisanal fishermen interests and livelihood against the industrial trawlers.
For some of them this was the rationale behind the decision and, therefore, argues
that the Ministry in charge of fisheries should not only increase the breadth of this
zone but also ensure that the industrial fishermen do not make incursions into it.

Similarly, two of the fishing trawlers captains interviewed believe that the prohibition
of the trawling activities into the three nautical miles zone is more a decision to
protect and help the artisanal fishermen rather than a measure to protect young fish.

This perception of the role of the three nautical mile zone prohibition, which for the
industrial fishers is more a social (protection of artisanal fishers interests) rather than

60

a biological (protection of spawning and growing areas) decision, may therefore
justify their culture of non compliance with this rule, which often result in artisanal
fishermen gears destruction and conflicts.

Moreover, the characteristics of fisheries the in the GOG coastal zone may give
incentives to this perception and the subsequent behavior of rule breaching. Indeed,
Koranteng (2002) indicates that the fish assemblages (croakers) on the continental
shelves of the GOG countries are located in the coastal areas, principally in nutrientrich estuarine and inshore areas; consequently in the restricted area of most of the
countries. This characteristic may act as an “incentive” that reinforces the behaviour
of the fish trawlers, in search of productive fishing grounds.
This situation of non enforcement of the area limitation rule is not limited to the
Cameroonian coast and extends to other countries of the GOG. A report from the
Sustainable Fisheries Livelihood Programme shows that the recurrent incursions of
industrial trawlers into the 10 nautical miles zone reserved to the artisanal fishermen
in Guinea Republic have led to the loss of artisanal fishermen lives, in addition to the
destruction of their fishing gears and canoes (Diallo, M. et al., 2003).

Similarly the 7-mile zone allocated to artisanal fishermen in Senegal is not all the
time comply with by the industrial fishing trawlers resulting in conflicts that are not in
general easy to settle (Zantou, P., 2006).

However, the industrial fishers’ perception of the area limitation and their
subsequent behaviour may not be the only reason that encourages them to breach
that rule, but also the absence of an effective enforcement body. The discussion
with the Master of one industrial fishing trawler revealed that they voluntarily enter
the prohibited zone as they know that fisheries surveillance system does not exist.

Indeed, effective fishing surveillance is still at its infancy in the Gulf of Guinea
countries. Although activities are being carried out in some countries such as
Senegal, Mauritania or the Guinea Republic with few good results, effective
enforcement bodies are absent in almost all the countries of the Gulf of Guinea.
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Furthermore, the move towards the satellite approach of surveillance is being made
in a slowly pace in many countries of the zone. In Cameroon for instance, the
authorities are still looking at the best way to make the industry accept to install
telemetric tools onboard industrial vessels, so as to start to monitor them; while
Gabon is still encountering logistics and technical problems (Ngwe, A., 2006).
The poor behaviour of “rules breaching” of the GOG industrial trawlers is partly
justified by their perception of the area limitation rule and the absence of an effective
enforcement body. This conclusion joins Mc Clanahan (2005) analysis concerning
the perception of Kenyan reefs fishermen towards rules. He asserts that a fisherman
will continue to use a method he thinks give him more yield unless he is stopped by
the enforcement body.

5.1.2 Perception towards gears
In the GOG, certain fishing gears and methods are prohibited. However, these
management measures are not fully enforced and the fishermen do not in reality
comply with them.

The perception of fishermen towards gear restriction was also looked at during the
discussions with the artisanal fishermen of the Batoke fishing village (Cameroon). A
previous study conducted by the MINEPIA in 2002, within the framework of the
Sustainable Fisheries Livelihood Programme (SFLP), has shown that more than
90% of the fishing gears used in that fishing village was beach seine, prohibited by a
Ministerial Arrete as part of the conservation measures to ensure the sustainability
of the resource (MINEPIA, 2003).

The discussions with the fishermen revealed that they are aware that the fishing
method is discouraged by the Government. Nevertheless, they explain that they
have been using this method for years resulting in good yields and argue that the
Government should focus in fighting against the use of poison or the incursion of
fishing trawlers into the three nautical miles zone. The end result is that this fishing
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community continues to use the beach seine technique and do not therefore enforce
the Law.

This intervention clearly shows that the fishermen continue to use that fishing
method because they perceive, it continues to sustain catches. The underlying
rationale behind this behaviour is the economic return of that particular fishing gear,
although the policymakers think it is very destructive. Therefore, any management
that will try to discourage the use of this type of fishing gear will not be successful
unless it is accompanied with sanctions and penalties.

This conclusion is also supported by Mc Clanahan et al. (2005), who studied the
perception of resource users and managers towards management options in Kenya
coral reefs and maintained that the acceptance of these restrictions by stakeholders
can vary for a variety of reasons including legal, economic , cultural, technological
reasons and may lead to confusion, conflicts, poor enforcement and unsustainable
use unless efforts are made to understand and rationalize the multiple type of
possible management.

They concluded that the persistence of prohibited seine

fishing techniques is the result of a competitive advantage and unlikely to be
eliminated without enforcement by the Government and pressures from others (Mc
Clanahan et al., 2005).

This economic based perception of resource users may also justify the sustainability
of destructive fishing methods, such as, poisoning or the use of blasts. Ukwe at al
(2006) maintained that the decline of the fish availability in the subsistence sector of
the GOG countries has led to the adoption of destructive practices.

Another case that illustrates how the discrepancy in perception can lead to poor
compliance in the Cameroonian context is the actual misunderstanding between
policy maker and industrial fishermen as concerns the installation of telemetric tools
on board fishing vessels as part of the Monitoring Control and Surveillance System.

A ministerial decision, signed in 2005 made compulsory the installation of telemetric
tools on board each fishing trawler as part of the requirements for the fishing license.
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However, this decision, to be implemented as from the 1st January 2006, has not yet
been enforced. All the fishing vessels have not complied with the decision and in
return, none of them have received a fishing license for 2006.

The fisheries administration, on the one hand, justifies the decision by arguing
rightly that the activities of the fishing vessels will be well monitored on the field,
which will therefore enhance the implementation of the regulation pertaining to the
respect of fishing zones and participe in the overall effort towards the conservation
of the resources. The industrial fishing owners on the other hand, did accept the
benefices of the approach for the conservation of the resources. They, however,
consider that the Government being in charge of the management of the resource
and the surveillance activities should bear the cost of the installation of the
telemetric tools. The result of this discrepancy of perception is that the management
decision is poorly enforced.

This situation illustrates as well the difficulty of enforcement within a situation of a
top down approach where there is a government authority that take decisions and
the fishing industry oblige to implement the decisions without a prior consultation.
The stakeholder consultation and involvement in the decision making is recognized
as being a good incentive for them to comply with the rules (Grossling, 2006).

5.2

Fishermen perception towards fisheries management in the EU

The fisheries management in the European Union is undertaken at the level of the
European Community through the Common Fisheries Policy; which is basically an
output limitation scheme, where fishing effort is controlled through total allowable
catch and quotas.

The perception of the European stakeholders towards the common fisheries
management policy was clearly summarized in the speech made by Mr Dermot
Ahern, President- in- Office of the Council, before the Fisheries Committee of the
European Parliament on Tuesday 20 January 2004 during the adoption of the
regulation on the Regional Advisory Councils. He maintained that:
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-

Fishermen are often sceptical about scientific advice and do not always feel

"ownership" of the decisions that determine their livelihoods;
-

Scientists too often wonder whether managers hide behind scientific advice

to avoid taking difficult political decisions;
-

There is a perception in some quarters, not always justified, that decision

makers are too removed from those affected by their decisions.
Mr Dermot Ahern Speech, Tuesday 20 January 2004

The fishermen of the European Union do not always feel the ownership of
management decisions. They do not therefore, have any incentive to enforce them
and adopt long term management strategies that result in the conservation of the
resource (EC, 2002).

This can be seen in the discrepancy between the official regulation (quotas) and
actual fish mortality. For example, Karagiannakos (1995) compares the trends of
landings and the agreed TACs from 1980 to 1994. He concluded that the landings
do not follow the agreed TAC but rather the status of the fish stock. Equally, data
from the Swedish Cod fishery, from 1974 to 2004, shows that the landings follow the
fish biomass. The fact that the landings do not follow the agreed TAC shows that EU
fishermen are violating the output control set by the EU.

Rossitier et al. (2003) reported from a study conducted in Scotland that, many
fishermen find it difficult to accept a management system that instructs them to
return marketable fish dead at sea.
This perception has certainly led to the development the illegal landing of “black fish”.
Richie as cited in Daw et al. (2005) points out after a study conducted on UK
landings that, there were a culture of “breaking rules” amongst fishermen and a high
reliance on illegal landings. The fishermen were violating the EU quota requirement
because of economic reasons and because the system was flawed and inefficient.
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Similarly, the phenomenon of “high grading”, in which fishermen retain larger and
more valuable fish and throw the others at sea, is wide spread in the EU waters in
total breath of the EU rules (Shepherd, 2003).

The perception of the fishermen towards management measures in the EU influence
greatly their willingness to enforce those rules.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusion
There are many ways to manage fisheries. The European Union countries on the
one hand, have opted for a common policy on fisheries management, which is
extensively based on the control of the “output” from fisheries through the total
allowable catch and the quota management system. The Gulf of Guinea countries,
on the other, have preferred to manage the fisheries resources at the national level,
based on measures that control “input” into fisheries through licenses and permits.

The analysis of the Common Fisheries Policy effectiveness concerning the
conservation of the resource reveals many problems that might jeopardized the
sustainability of the resource. The setting of the total allowable catch is surrounded
by political pressure and does not therefore always reflect the scientific advice
provided by the ICES; the fishing fleet policy, which aimed at reducing the fishing
capacity, is overbalanced by grants for new building and the modernization of the
existing fleet sustaining, therefore, the overcapacity and the subsequent
overexploitation; the quota system has encouraged, the “high grading” phenomena
where, big and valuable fish are retain on board and the others are thrown
overboard, increasing the discards at sea.
The perception of the fishermen towards the management measures shows that
they do not always feel the “ownership” of the measures that determine their
livelihoods and therefore do not feel bound by them. These perceptions have led
fishermen to adopt behaviour of rules breaching including landings of illegal fish and
misreporting.
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Conversely, the analysis of the effectiveness of management measures undertaken
by the Gulf of Guinea countries shows that they might result “in principle” in the
conservation of the resource. In relation to the characteristics of the resources in the
coastal zone, there are measures limiting the access of trawlers; measures
prohibiting certain type of fishing methods and fishing gears; measures limitating the
mesh and the fish sizes. However, these management measures are not fully
enforced, resulting in the degradation of fish stocks in the zone.
In addition, the management of the offshore resources, done through fishing
agreements signed with the EU or Asian countries, generally encourages the
overcapacity and the subsequent overexploitation of the resource.
Moreover, the study conducted in some fishing villages in Cameroon reveals that
the fishermen perception towards management measures varies according to the
measure in question and to the class of fishermen (industrial or artisanal). The
industrial fishermen perceive the area limit rule as a social decision in favor of
artisanal fishermen and are, therefore, not willing to enforce it. Further, the artisanal
fishermen consider some gear prohibition as a threat to their high yield harvesting
tool, sustaining therefore the activity.
The analysis of the perception of the fishermen towards management measures in
the European Union and in the Gulf of Guinea show that fishermen are willing to
breach any measure perceived as reducing their income or the economic return of
their activity. Consequently, their willingness to comply with the management
measures are more influenced by the economy rather than any other factor
including the conservation of the resource or their participation in the decision
making.
Therefore, in both areas, any management measure adopted to ensure the
conservation of the resource, regardless the way that it was enacted: by the law
making body alone or with the participation of the resource users should be
accompanied by an effective enforcement tool.
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6.2 Recommendations
Based on the above conclusions, certain recommendations can be made for a better
management, which ensures the conservation of the resource.

6.2.1 For the European Union countries
The management of the resource under the CFP should move from the indirect
control of the fishing effort through total allowable catch and quota management to a
more direct control of the effort through the number of days at sea.
This system has some advantages. The fishermen would be able to land and sell all
the marketable sizes of fish caught. Therefore, the phenomenon of discards of over
quota fish at sea and “high grading” will disappear (Shepherd, 2003).
Furthermore, the misreporting of catches and the illegal landings of fish will be
reduced, enabling the scientists to have accurate data on the fisheries and therefore,
enhancing their capability to give relevant advice.
Moreover, the approach will help to solve the problem of mixed fisheries, by allowing
the landings of all the species cached, reducing therefore the discards at sea.
Fishermen may, therefore reduce the fishing effort by deducing the number of
fishing days and still have economic return of the activity (Rossitier et al., 2003).
However, such a system to give expected results should put in place effective
enforcement tools, which monitor the compliance with the number of days at sea by
each fishing vessel. For example, the European Community could put in place a
regional enforcement body that use satellite instruments to monitor activities of the
fishing vessels. Accurate information on the movement of each vessel will then be
available including effective days at sea and days of rests.
In addition to this input approach of management, decommissioning should really
play its role of reducing the fishing capacity. Therefore, the EU should make the
funds available for the decommissioning scheme equal to those available for the
building of new vessel or for the modernization of the existing fleet. This will reduce
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or avoid increasing the capacity and therefore, enhances the conservation of the
resource.

6.2.2 For the Gulf of Guinea countries
The Gulf of Guinea countries should keep the actual management approach based
on input into the fisheries. However, in each country of the zone, the enforcement
need to be strengthened and some technical conservative measures should be
changed.
The countries of the Gulf of Guinea should put in place effective Monitoring Control
and Surveillance Systems preferably based on satellite aids, to ensure that the
management measures are fully comply with by the industrial fishermen.
There is a need to increase the zone prohibited for the trawling activities, so as
ensure a proper protection of the spawning and growing areas, ensuring therefore
the renewal of the resource.
The collaboration between the fisheries authorities and the fishing communities
should be enhanced in the form of co-management or a collaborative enforcement
body, to ensure that resource users views are taken in account during the setting of
the management measures and that they comply with those measures. This
approach can be done through “fishing villages management committees”, which
include a “local enforcement body” to avoid the use of destructive fishing method
and gears by fishermen themselves.
The countries of the GOG should attempt to harmonize their fishing legislation
concerning the access to the resource and the management measures, which can
be done through a regional organization. In fact an attempt is being made by the
Regional Fisheries Committee for the Gulf of Guinea, with less success and do not
even include all the countries of the zone.
The countries should equally adopt a regional enforcement body for the surveillance
of the fishing activities in their EEZ and their boundary areas. This joint body could
take the responsibility to negotiate with the European Union and the Asian countries
for the fisheries agreements, to secure advantageous agreements that help the
national economies and ensure the conservation of the resource.
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APPENDIX I
Guide for the discussions conducted with fishermen
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Knowledge about fishing management measures
Limits on areas
Point of view about limits on areas
Gears prohibition
Point of view on gear prohibition
Economic consequences
Social consequences
Adhesion to measures
Propositions
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